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The aim of the article is to provide a brief comparison of the legal effects of soft law 
documents in the administrative law systems of the US and the EU. In this regard, the article 
tries to define the fine line between soft law documents that intend to have legal effects and 
those that have practical binding effects. Additionally, some questions will be raised 
regarding the meaning of “practical binding effects” and its relation to genuine legal effects. 
Soft law is traditionally defined as a rule with “no legally binding force which nevertheless 
may have practical effects”1. The publication of soft law documents may also be considered 
as soft post-legislative rule-making2, since most times soft law is adopted to further elaborate, 
interpret legislative acts. Even without legal effects, both the authorities and the interested 
parties rely on soft law documents. However, the use of such soft law is not a pathology of 
the rule-making ossification, it is rather a general phenomenon of a complex administrative 
law system. Soft law rules bring flexibility and adaptability in a rigid legal order, in addition 
to providing guidance and uniformity for the lower-levels of the executive.3 From the 
perspective of the interested public, soft law rules can at the same time create a sense of 
predictability by provide information on the future practice of the agency, while creating 
uncertainty by their undecided force of law effect.  
The problem arise when soft law documents intend to do more than giving guidance and 
contain more imperative language. In these cases, soft law intends to replace legislative acts, 
usually without going through the same procedure. Both the US and the EU courts have 
developed similar judicial tests to handle these cases and annul soft law documents with legal 
effects. Nevertheless, the line between documents with only practical binding effects and 
legal effects is not always clear, thus the courts usually have a wide margin of appreciation in 
deciding these cases. 
 
                                                 
1 SYNDER 1993b 35. See also: STEFAN 2008. 754., SENDEN 2013. 62. 
2 SENDEN 2013. 57-75. 
3 FRANKLIN 2010. 303. 
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The US system of agency rule-making and soft law acts 
 
In the US legal system the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) covers the rule-
making activities of every federal governmental entity, ranging from departments to 
independent agencies.4 The scope of the APA covers both rule-making and adjudication (or 
single case decision-making).  
The most formalized type of agency rules is the legislative rule. In this case Congress 
provides an agency with a statutory authorization to promulgate the necessary rules – 
constitutionally in line with the non-delegation doctrine. Then the agency adopts the 
legislative rule according to the provisions of either formal or informal rule-making procedure 
under the APA and publishes it in the Federal Register. Legislative rules are generally binding 
on the affected public and the agency itself and they have a force of law effect just as 
statutes.5 However, since the adoption of a legislative rule can be very time-consuming, 
agencies have come up with more informal ways to inform the regulated community and their 
own lower-ranking officials of the agencies practice and interpretation of rules. Federal 
agencies adopt a large amount of soft law documents at different level of informality and thus 
with different binding powers. Under the § 552(a)(1) and (2) of the APA, the distinction lies 
between interpretive rules and policy statements, both of which are exempted from the 
general procedural requirements of legislative rules. Interpretive rules inform the public on 
the agencies' interpretation of statutes or legislative rules, while policy statements put self-
imposed restrictions on the agencies' discretionary power by informing the public on how the 
discretion will be exercised.6 In order to the interpretive rules to be able to bind the regulated 
community and to be relied on by the community, these soft law rules must also be published 
in the Federal Register, but no other procedural requirements are imposed on their adoption 
under the APA. General statements of policy must also be published, however, they do not 
constitute a binding rule with force of law. Due to their easier promulgation, these soft law 
sources have started to outnumber legislative rules. According to Strauss for example the 
„rules of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) take up two inches, but the 
corresponding technical guidance materials are well in excess of forty feet.”7 
So the concept is that these soft law sources do not have to be exposed to public 
consultation procedure. However, since interpretive rules and policy statements are under the 
scope of the APA, the same rules of judicial review apply to them (or at least surely to 
interpretive rules) as to legislative rules. Thus federal courts have the right to annul them, for 
example if the duties created by them are “not fairly encompassed within the interpreted 
regulation”,8 so basically when they try to create entirely new obligations. Although non-
legislative rules are not supposed to carry force of law under the system of the APA, as a 
practical matter, they are often relied on as if they were binding rules. Consequently, the 
                                                 
4 STRAUSS et al. 2011. 12. 
5
 STRAUSS 1992. 1466. 
6 MERRILL-WATTS 2002. 467-477. 
7 STRAUSS 1992. 1469. 
8 Air Transport Association of America v. FAA, 291 F3d 49 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
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federal courts gradually developed a complex system of case law to supervise that soft law 
sources do not impose obligations that can be established only through normal rule-making.9 
In an influential paper, Robert A. Anthony approached the legal effects of soft law 
documents. He described interpretive rules as rules with practical binding effect which “non-
legislatively announce or act upon an interpretation that it intends to enforce in a binding 
way, so long as it stays within the fair intendment of the statute and does not add substantive 
content of its own”10. While under his taxonomy, all other “substantive rule-making 
documents – such as policy statements, guidances, manuals, circulars, memoranda, bulletins, 
and the like-are in APA terminology “policy statements,” which the agency is not entitled to 
make binding, either as a legal matter or as a practical matter”.11 Under this approach the 
main distinction is that while interpretive rules rely on an existing legislative act – either a 
statute or a legislative rule – and they only explain, interpret this, when its meaning is 
tangible. This interpretation is considered practically binding by Anthony, so long as it does 
not try to create new obligations. As opposed to this, policy statements spell out new, not 
existing policies, however, they are not at all binding on the agency, or the affected public, 
also since they do not create legal obligations, judicial review is not available against them. 
Consequently, if an agency adopted an interpretive rule that contains a new right or 
obligation, it is either violating the notice and comment rule-making requirement of the APA 
– as it should have been adopted as a legislative rule, or it shall be considered a policy 
statement without any binding effect.12 While if an agency adopted a policy statement that 
intended to have legal consequences, it is also in violation of the APA. In this case, judicial 
review is available, because the content of the policy statement is in fact that of a legislative 
rule, thus it can be reviewed, as opposed to a policy statement without binding effect. 
 
The judicial interpretation of soft law norms in the US 
 
US courts have dealt with issues of non-legislative rules in a number of cases, from which we 





In the case of Air Transport Association of America, INC. v. Federal Aviation Agency13 (ATA 
v. FAA) the D.C. Circuit dealt with questions regarding interpretive rules. The factual 
beginning of the case was, when in 1985, pursuant to notice-and-comment rule-making, the 
FAA promulgated a legislative rule, establishing flight time limitations and rest requirements 
for „flight crew members engaged in air transportation”. Since the rule left some technical 
                                                 
9 United States v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218 (2001), Skidmore v. Swift & Co, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), 
10 ANTHONY 1992. 1313. 
11 Uo. 1315. 
12 Uo. 1324-1326. 
13 291 F.3d 49 (2002) 
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issues open, a pilot submitted questions to the agency in 2000, which were answered by the 
FAA's Deputy Counsel James Whitlow, hence the name “Whitlow letter”. Later on the 
agency published a notice in the Federal Register, stating that it intends to rigorously enforce 
the regulation, and this notice included the Whitlow letter as well. The ATA challenged the 
notice. The ATA claimed among others that the FAA violated the APA because the Whitlow 
Letter is a substantive, not an interpretative rule. The circuit court first stated that 
“one factor we consider in distinguishing between the two is "whether the 
interpretation itself carries the force and effect of law, or rather whether it spells out a 
duty fairly encompassed within the regulation that the interpretation purports to 
construe." Then went on to hold that there was no violation of the §533 of APA, since 
“the interpretation contained in the Whitlow Letter is "fairly encompassed" within the 
regulation it purports to construe and, therefore, under our circuit precedent is an 
interpretative rule exempt from notice-and-comment rule-making.” 
In the case of Appalachian Power Company, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA)14 the D.C. Circuit decided on the legality of the EPA's "Periodic Monitoring Guidance 
for Title V Operating Permits Programs" that took a new approach to the monitoring 
requirements for State emission permit programs, which should be adopted under the Clean 
Air Act. The circuit court first of gave an expressive description of the general notion of non-
legislative rules, when it stated that 
“The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly worded 
statute. The agency follows with regulations containing broad language, open-ended 
phrases, ambiguous standards and the like. Then as years pass, the agency issues 
circulars or guidance or memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often 
expanding the commands in the regulations. One guidance document may yield another 
and then another and so on. Several words in a regulation may spawn hundreds of 
pages of text as the agency offers more and more detail regarding what its regulations 
demand of regulated entities.” 
Then the court went in to the binding effect of non-legislative rules and held that although 
“only "legislative rules" have the force and effect of law (…) but we have also 
recognized that an agency's other pronouncements can, as a practical matter, have a 
binding effect.” 
Thus the court confirmed the practical binding effect of non-legislative rules. Moreover, it 
also provided a rather detailed set of factors to evaluate soft law documents: 
„if an agency acts as if a document issued at headquarters is controlling in the field, if 
it treats the document in the same manner as it treats a legislative rule, if it bases 
enforcement actions on the policies or interpretations formulated in the document, if it 
leads private parties or State permitting authorities to believe that it will declare 
permits invalid unless they comply with the terms of the document, then the agency's 
document is for all practical purposes "binding."” 
                                                 
14 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
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The case also raised the question whether if the guidance document should have gone through 
the notice and comment rule-making procedure based on its content that – according to the 
petitioners – create new obligations. Following a detailed analysis of the text of the guidance 
the court concluded that some elements of the guidance significantly broadened the prior rule, 





The D.C. Circuit has also reviewed a number of policy statements. In the case of the Center 
for Auto Safety, et. al. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) from 
2006.15 The case evolved around the motor vehicle manufacturers' practice to initiate 
voluntary “regional recalls”, meaning that if a vehicle showed safety-related defects due to 
certain weather conditions, the manufacturers limited the recalls of such vehicles to owners in 
the given region with the certain weather conditions. In 1997/1998 the NHTSA started 
sending out letters to manufacturers, outlining NHTSA's “policy guidelines” for “regional 
recalls” and stating concerns with the practice of regional recalls. These policy guidelines sent 
out in letters were challenged by Center for Auto Safety, who claimed that its content 
constitutes a “de facto legislative rule”, thus the guidelines should have been adopted through 
proper rule-making procedure. The court held that the guidelines do not substitute a binding 
rule that is finally determinative of the issues it addresses, thus they are not a final agency 
action, consequently judicial review cannot be available against them. In its reasoning the 
court stated that 
“in determining whether an agency has issued a binding norm or merely an 
unreviewable statement of policy, we are guided by two lines of inquiry.(...) One line of 
analysis considers the effects of an agency's action, inquiring whether the agency has 
(1) impose[d] any rights and obligations, or (2) genuinely [left] the agency and its 
decision-makers free to exercise discretion. (…) The second line of analysis looks to the 
agency's expressed intentions. This entails a consideration of three factors:  (1) the 
[a]gency's own characterization of the action;  (2) whether the action was published in 
the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations;  and (3) whether the action 
has binding effects on private parties or on the agency.” 
According to the court a general statement of policy is in violation of the APA informal rule-
making provisions and reviewable only if 
“an agency cannot escape its responsibility to present evidence and reasoning 
supporting its substantive rules by announcing binding precedent in the form of a 
general statement of policy”. 
The court found that this was not the case here, the agency only spelled out a general 
policy statement, without legal force or legal consequences. Nonetheless, the court admitted 
                                                 
15 452 F.3d 798 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
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that the guidelines had consequences for the manufacturers, only not from a legal, but from a 
practical sense, since they voluntarily accommodated their recall practices. 
As we can see from the above mentioned cases, when courts are dealing with non-
legislative rules, regardless whether interpretive rules or general statements of policy, the 
normal course of inquiry focuses on the content of the rule and aims to determine if it has 
binding effect. So in the end, courts do not focus on the procedure in which the rule was 
adopted to determine its legal effects, but on the substance to determine whether the right 
procedure was used or informal rule-making procedure should have been used. This is a 
rather burdensome exercise for the courts, since in most cases it is not easy to determine 
whether the rule intended to have force of law effects. For this reason, there are voices in the 
legal literature advocating a more straightforward approach to determine the force of law 
effects of a rule.16 Franklin for example promotes an approach called the “short cut”, which 
would reverse the judicial test: instead of looking in to the substance, according to him, courts 
should focus on the procedure. Under this approach, only those rules that went through the 
notice and comment rule-making procedure would be afforded legally binding power and 
force of law effects, and everything else would be denied such force.17 This approach could 
be easily reconciled with Strauss's idea, who suggested that instead of trying to figure out the 
difference between practically and legally binding rules, non-legislative rules should be 
treated similarly to adjudicatory decisions, and only afford them the force of precedent,18 
which binds the agency and indicative for the interested parties, however, not the same as 
having a force of law effect. 
 
Soft law documents in the EU 
 
The EU’s approach towards soft law documents is both comparable and distinct from the US 
model, which is partially due to the fundamental differences between the two systems. 
The legal base for the publication of soft law documents can be found in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 288 lists recommendations and opinions 
among the legal act of the Union, while at the same time asserting the recommendations and 
opinion shall have no binding force. Beyond the two categories mentioned explicitly in the 
TFEU, EU institutions and bodies – just like US agencies – also publish a wide range of 
guidance documents labeled differently, such as communications, guidelines, notices, 
guidance documents, circulars, etc. An interesting difference between these unofficial and the 
official categories can be found in their publishing. Similarly to the US, it is also a 
requirement at EU level to publish these soft law documents, but while recommendations and 
opinions are published in the L series in the Official Journal, communications and other 
unofficial soft law documents are published in the C series,19 which signalizes that 
                                                 
16 See e.g.: FRANKLIN 2010. 276. or MERRILL-WATTS 2002. 467. 
17 FRANKLIN 2010. 279.  
18
 STRAUSS 1992.1486. 
19 HOFFMANN et. al. 2011. 
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recommendations and opinions are acknowledged as legal acts of the EU, meanwhile 
communications are not. 
From the numerous ways of categorizing soft law documents,20 we only mention Linda 
Senden's approach, which shows similarities to the US approach. According to her, soft law 
acts can either be classified as interpretative acts or decisional acts.21 Interpretative acts 
summarize how EU law should be understood and applied, and as such it is often an indicator 
for the national authorities as well. While decisional acts indicate how the Commission will 
use its discretionary powers in single-case decisions (e.g. in competition law or state aid).  
 
The judicial review of soft law in the EU 
 
The lack of binding force of soft law is also reflected in Article 263 of the TFEU that states 
that the Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, of 
acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than 
recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of the European 
Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall also review the 
legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects 
vis-à-vis third parties. Interestingly, the distinction between acts with and without legal 
effects is missing from the provisions on the preliminary ruling procedure, as Article 267 
holds that the Court shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning (…) the 
validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union. 
The ECJ’s jurisprudence shows that the review of soft law documents is possible both 
through an action for annulment and through a preliminary ruling procedure. Even though, 
from Article 263 TFEU it would seem that an action for annulment is not available against 
soft law documents, the Court consistently held that 
“It would be inconsistent with this objective to interpret the conditions under which the 
action is admissible so restrictively as to limit the availability of this procedure merely 
to the categories of measures referred to by article 189. 
An action for annulment must therefore be available in the case of all measures 
adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have 
legal effects.”22 
Thus in order to decide whether an action for annulment is admissible, the content of the 
soft law document must be examined to see if it intended to have legal effects. Naturally, this 
review is also decisive in the merits of the case, since if the soft law document was intended 
to have legal effects, then an action for annulment is well-founded. In the France v. 
                                                 
20 See for example: TREPAN 2014. 13-25. 
21 SENDEN 2013. 60. 
22 Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, EU:C:1971:32 paragraph 38-42. 
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Commission case23 for example the Court decided that the `Commission Communication on 
an Internal Market for Pension Funds' must be annulled, due to the following reasons: 
“The fact that the Communication was published after the proposal for a directive was 
withdrawn indicates that the Commission was seeking, by means of the Communication, 
to secure the application of rules identical or similar to those contained in the proposal 
for a directive. (…) 
Accordingly, it must be observed in the first place that those provisions of the 
Communication are characterized by their imperative wording. (…) 
In those circumstances, it must be held that the Communication constitutes an act 
intended to have legal effects of its own, distinct from those already provided for by the 
Treaty provisions on freedom to provide services, freedom of establishment and free 
movement of capital, with the result that an action for annulment will lie against it. 
(…)” 
A number of cases have arisen from the field of competition law as the Commission has 
published a number of soft law documents in this field (e.g. Guidelines on the method of 
setting fines, the Leniency notice, or the de minimis notice). Also, due the Commission’s 
direct supervisory and adjudicatory powers, a lot of cases have reached the Court appealing 
the single-case decisions of the Commission. In these cases, the Court has reached a number 
of important conclusions related to soft law documents. The Court held in the Dansk 
Rørindustri case24 that soft law documents 
“may not be regarded as rules of law which the administration is always bound to 
observe, they nevertheless form rules of practice from which the administration may not 
depart in an individual case without giving reasons that are compatible with the 
principle of equal treatment.” 
“In adopting such rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them that they will 
henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the institution in question imposes a 
limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those rules under pain of 
being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of the general principles of law, such 
as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations. It cannot therefore be 
precluded that, on certain conditions and depending on their content, such rules of 
conduct, which are of general application, may produce legal effects.” 
The question of the binding (soft binding, self-binding) effect of soft law was best 
elaborated in the Grimaldi case,25 where a preliminary ruling procedure was brought to the 
Court by the Belgian courts. The dispute in the case arose from a conflict of national and EU 
soft law documents. The plaintiff was suffering from Dupuytren's contracture, which was not 
contained in the Belgian schedule of occupational diseases but could be deemed to be a 
„disease caused by the over-straining of peritendinous tissue”. This disease appears in point F 
6(b) of the European schedule of occupational diseases which the Recommendation of 23 July 
                                                 
23 France v Commission, C-57/95, EU:C:1997:164 
24 C-189/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, EU:C:2005:408 
25 C-322/88 Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles, EU:C:1989:646 
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1962 recommended should be introduced into national law.26 The Court first stated that a 
request for preliminary ruling is admissible. Then on the merits of the case, the Court went on 
and famously held that:  
“In these circumstances there is no reason to doubt that the measures in question are 
true recommendations, that is to say measures which, even as regards the persons to 
whom they are addressed, are not intended to produce binding effects. Consequently, 
they cannot create rights upon which individuals may rely before a national court. (…) 
However, in order to give a comprehensive reply to the question asked by the 
national court, it must be stressed that the measures in question cannot therefore be 
regarded as having no legal effect. The national courts are bound to take 
recommendations into consideration in order to decide disputes submitted to them, in 
particular where they cast light on the interpretation of national measures adopted in 
order to implement them or where they are designed to supplement binding Community 
provisions.” 
 
Common features and distinctions between the EU and the US 
 
It is important to note that while in their legal effects and judicial review, soft law seems to be 
approached almost identically in the EU and in the US, still there are some fundamental 
differences that must be mentioned beforehand. 
First and foremost, most cases of the ECJ regarding soft law documents concern soft law 
documents published by the Commission and not EU agencies. This is clearly related to 
differences between EU and US administrative agencies and their powers of rule-making or in 
the EU rather the lack thereof. This phenomenon might be changing with the establishment of 
EU agencies with more and more regulatory powers (see for example ESMA and the other 
ESAs). Soft law in the US is attached to the rule-making activity of the agency, as it interprets 
or rarely even supplements legislative rules of the same agency. Meanwhile in the EU, soft 
law documents, regardless whether they are published by the Commission or by an agency, 
are attached to a legal act adopted by the main institutions of the EU. 
As we mentioned above, the evolution of soft law documents in the US has been closely 
linked to the ossification of the notice and comment rule-making procedure. In the EU, there 
seem to be other reasons fueling the spread of such soft legislative mechanisms. On the one 
hand, soft law documents are adopted in order the inform the interested parties of the 
Commission’s use of its discretion – in this regard the US model is parallel. On the other 
hand, the Commission is also able to influence directly or indirectly national regulatory 
authorities by publishing soft law documents, which is a unique feature of the EU’s shared 
administration. 
Under the normal functioning of soft law, it informs the regulated community about how 
the Commission – or in the US, an agency – interprets a legislative act and how it will apply it 
                                                 
26 C-322/88 Grimaldi, EU:C:1989:646, paragraph 4. 
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in a single-case decision-making process. However, since these guidance documents do not 
have any legal effect or binding force, they cannot create any rights or obligations for the 
interested parties. Still they can give rise to certain legitimate expectations and due to legal 
certainty concerns they bound the publishing authority, in the EU maybe even the national 
authorities. This phenomenon of soft law is described as a “practical binding effect” both in 
the EU and in the US. In both systems, the judicial review acknowledges this practical 
binding effect and differentiates it from “real” legal effects. In case a soft law document is 
intended to produce legal effects, then the soft law is annulled by the courts. Nevertheless, 
there is a fine line between practical binding effects and genuine legal effects, which leaves 
the courts great discretion in these cases. This is also reflected in the above mentioned judicial 
tests that use ambiguous standards to evaluate the existence of legal effects.  
With the rise of agencies in the EU and with the ever-increasing complexity of 
administrative legal systems in both the EU and the US, the ambiguous legal status of soft law 
documents may raise more and more questions. Soft law documents will always exist in 
administrative systems, but it would be highly important to better clarify their legal status. 
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SOFT LAW ESZKÖZÖK AZ EGYESÜLT ÁLLAMOK ÉS AZ EURÓPAI UNIÓ 
KÖZIGAZGATÁSI JOGÁBAN 
 
A tanulmány a soft law források joghatásával foglalkozik az Egyesült Államok és az Európai 
Unió közigazgatási jogában. E dokumentumok elméletileg jogi kötelező erő nélküli 
szabályok, melyek legfeljebb közvetett gyakorlati hatással rendelkeznek. Létrejöttük szoros 
összefüggésben van a hatóságok mérlegelési jogkörével, hiszen egyik funkciójuk, hogy a 
hatóság saját munkatársai számára útmutatást nyújtsanak, hogy a tételes jogban 
megfogalmazott mérlegelést engedő szabályt hogyan értelmezzék és alkalmazzák az egyedi 
ügyekben. Amint nyilvánossá válnak ezek a mérlegelési jogkört kitöltő dokumentumok, a 
külső jogalanyoknak jogos várakozása keletkezik, hogy a jogbiztonság és a kiszámíthatóság 
jegyében az ő egyedi ügyükben is az ajánlásnak, közleménynek, útmutatónak megfelelő 
döntés szülessen. Ez már nemzeti szinten is problémákat jelenthet, de különös jelentősége van 
olyan összetett jogi-szervezeti konstrukciókban, mint az EU kétszintű végrehajtása vagy az 
amerikai szövetségi rendszer. A soft law forrásokkal kapcsolatos kérdések közül a tanulmány 
kettőt említ. Elsőként az amerikai és az uniós bírói választ elemzi arra az esetre, ha a soft law 
jogokat és kötelezettségeket állapít meg. Ezt követően pedig azt vizsgálja, hogy a soft law 
kötőereje – ha van ilyen – kire terjed ki és milyen mértékben. 
 
 
